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Company Profile · Utilities · ~9 min read

WindForce Disclosure Profile

An assessment of WindForce PLC’s 2025/26 Annual Report, its first mandatory filing under SLFRS S1 and S2. The profile records what the report discloses and what it does not, criterion by criterion, with a page reference for each finding.
Why we profiled this company
ESGNexus profiles the largest CSE-listed company by market capitalisation in each major sector, with sectors sequenced by their contribution to GDP. WindForce is the largest company in the CSE Utilities sector, valued at Rs 60.94 bn on 31 March 2026 (p.347).
Snapshot — WindForce PLC
Company (legal name + ticker)WindForce PLC (WIND.N0000). Incorporated 6 July 2010; converted to a public limited company 22 April 2021 (p.2)
SectorUtilities: renewable power generation from wind, solar and hydro
Market-cap rank in sector#1 in the CSE Utilities sector. Rs 60.94 bn at 31 March 2026 (p.347); ranking cross-checked against CSE market data on 15 November 2026
Financial year coveredFY2025/26 (ended 31 March 2026). First mandatory SLFRS period: adopted as a top-100 CSE company by market capitalisation (p.207)
Reporting frameworksSLFRS S1 and S2, “prepared in accordance with” (p.91); GRI Standards, “in accordance with” (p.350); <IR> Framework; SASB Electric Utilities & Power Generators (pp.358–359); UN SDGs
External assuranceErnst & Young, limited assurance (SLSAE 3000 Revised) over “EESG indicators”, with GRI as the only criteria. SLFRS S1 and S2 are not named; no list of indicators or pages in scope (pp.348–349)
Materiality processGRI impact assessment: ten steps, 15-topic matrix (pp.81–85). SLFRS financial materiality: likelihood against magnitude, run by management with external advisers (pp.96–99). Reviewed annually
Scope 1 & 2 emissions663.587 tCO₂e, FY2025/26 base year: Scope 1 247.658; Scope 2 415.929 (location-based). GHG Protocol, operational control (p.120)
Scope 3 / financed emissionsNot disclosed. Deferred under the SLFRS S2 relief; to be reported from FY2027/28 (pp.95, 122)
Climate scenario analysisPhysical risk only: seven hazards by district under SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5, 2030 and 2050 (pp.118–119). No transition scenario; scenario-analysis relief elected (p.122)
Net-zero / carbon targetNone stated. FY2025/26 set as base year; 2030 targets to be set within one to two years (pp.90, 204)
Board climate governance / ESG oversightBoard Risk Committee, constituted 6 November 2025 and assigned ESG and climate oversight; three non-executives, two independent; four meetings (pp.207, 258). No sustainability KPI linked to pay (p.102)
Board independence3 of 10 directors independent (30%) at 31 March 2026 (pp.58, 208). Non-executive, non-independent chairman (p.58). Two largest shareholders hold 57.00% between them; public holding 24.57% (pp.346–347)
CSR commitmentNo percentage commitment stated. Rs 30 mn community investment in FY2025/26, reported as reaching 72,000+ people (p.188)
ESGNexus disclosure assessmentSubstantial 5.0 of 7 applicable criteria (0.71), Methodology v1.2. Materiality, Scope 1 and 2 emissions, board oversight and integration are disclosed, and physical-climate scenarios are run. Scope 3 is deferred to FY2027/28, transition scenarios are not run and no targets are set.
Source: WindForce PLC, Annual Report 2025/26 (FYE 31 March 2026). Sector ranking cross-checked against CSE market data, 15 November 2026.
Key takeaways
  • Scope 1 and 2 emissions total 663.587 tCO₂e for FY2025/26, which the company sets as its base year, measured under the GHG Protocol with a location-based grid factor (p.120). Scope 3 is deferred under the transitional relief and will be reported from FY2027/28 (p.95).
  • The report runs physical-climate scenarios, SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 to 2030 and 2050, for every district where it has assets (pp.118–119), while electing the relief that allows scenario analysis to be left out (p.122). Transition scenarios are not analysed.
  • No emissions target is set. Targets for 2030 are to follow within one to two years (p.204).
  • Seven sustainability and climate risks are identified. Six come with defined metrics but no values; the figures are deferred to the next report (pp.104–117).
  • Ernst & Young’s limited assurance covers “EESG indicators” against GRI criteria. SLFRS S1 and S2 are not named among the criteria (pp.348–349).
WindForce generated 569,340 MWh of renewable electricity in FY2025/26 (p.97). This year, for the first time, it also measured what its own operations emit: 663.587 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent across Scope 1 and Scope 2, within the subsidiaries it controls (p.120). For a renewable generator, that figure is small by design. The harder questions SLFRS S2 puts to a company like this concern its exposure: how a changing climate affects wind, rainfall and irradiance at its sites, and how the energy transition affects the grid that buys its power.
The report answers part of that. It identifies seven climate and sustainability risks, names the board committee that oversees them, and runs physical-hazard scenarios for every district where it has assets. It leaves Scope 3 emissions, emissions targets and the numbers behind most of those seven risks for later reports. On our seven-criterion checklist that produces a Substantial band, 5.0 of 7.

The Business, Briefly

WindForce is an independent power producer with 31 plants and 253 MW of installed capacity at 31 March 2026 (p.124). It operates eight wind farms, all in Sri Lanka; 13 solar plants, nine in Sri Lanka and four in Pakistan, Uganda and Ukraine; and ten mini-hydro plants, eight in Sri Lanka and two in Uganda (p.92). In Sri Lanka, its main buyer is the National System Operator, under power purchase agreements that typically run 20 years from commercial operation (pp.93, 102). Group revenue for the year was Rs 8.04 bn and profit after tax Rs 2.15 bn (p.44). The group has 24 subsidiaries and six associates (p.210).
It is also building battery storage. The company holds 13 standalone battery projects, 130 MW / 520 MWh, under the national grid-scale storage programme, with Letters of Award dated 16 February and 20 March 2026; twelve sit in a joint venture in which WindForce holds 51% (pp.8, 41). ESGNexus’s 13 October 2026 analysis of that tender described the thirteenth award as unreported. The company’s annual report, filed with the CSE in August 2026, dates it to 20 March.

Disclosure And Frameworks

This is WindForce’s sixth integrated report and its first under SLFRS S1 and S2, which it adopted as one of the top 100 CSE companies by market capitalisation (pp.4, 207). The SLFRS section states that it was “prepared in accordance with” both standards (p.91). The report also claims GRI “in accordance with” (p.350), maps itself to the SASB standard for electric utilities and power generators (pp.358–359) and follows the <IR> Framework.
Materiality is described twice, once for each purpose. A ten-step GRI process produces a 15-topic matrix that plots impact on stakeholders against impact on the organisation (pp.81–85). A separate two-step assessment for SLFRS rates each risk by likelihood and the size of its financial effect, and management ran it with external advisers (pp.96–99). Both methods are shown, which is what criterion 1 asks for. The account of how much work was done is less consistent. Page 5 describes a comprehensive assessment carried out with Deloitte. Page 81 calls the year’s exercise a review and says a broader assessment covering SLFRS S1 and S2 is planned for next year. Page 96 says a “robust and detailed” SLFRS assessment was performed this year.
The relief elections need the same care. Appendix I lists the first-year reliefs the company took: no comparatives, no Scope 3, no scenario analysis and no anticipated financial effects. It did not take the relief that would have limited the report to climate risks alone (pp.121–122). Page 99 says the opposite, stating that the climate-only relief was used. The risk table supports Appendix I, since it includes non-climate risks such as supplier ESG compliance and end-of-life asset management (p.100).
Assurance is narrower than the word suggests. Ernst & Young gave limited assurance under SLSAE 3000 (Revised) over the report’s “Economic, Environment, Social and Governance (EESG) indicators”, with the GRI Standards as the only criteria (pp.348–349). The engagement does not list which indicators or pages it covered, and SLFRS S1 and S2 are not named. The company’s own summary describes the assurance as confirming that its sustainability information was prepared in accordance with GRI (p.5).

Environmental

The emissions disclosure is the most complete part of the climate section. Scope 1 is 247.658 tCO₂e from fuel use and fugitive emissions. Scope 2 is 415.929 tCO₂e from grid electricity, calculated with the Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority’s location-based factor (p.120). The inventory follows the GHG Protocol on an operational-control boundary, applies IPCC AR6 warming potentials, and tabulates the source of each emission factor (p.120). FY2025/26 is the base year, so there is no prior-year figure to compare against (p.200).
Two presentation choices complicate the table. It subtracts 238,693 tonnes of emissions avoided through renewable generation from the 663.587-tonne inventory and labels the result “Net GHG Emissions” (p.120). Avoided emissions estimate what the grid would otherwise have emitted; the GHG Protocol reports them separately from an inventory rather than deducting them, and SLFRS S2 asks for gross figures, which the report also provides. The same table labels its units MTCO2, while its header and the Natural Capital section use tCO₂e (pp.120, 200).
Scope 3 is not quantified. The report says it will be reported from FY2027/28 under the SLFRS S2 relief, using the GHG Protocol’s fifteen categories (pp.94–95). Over the next one to two years, the company plans to start collecting Scope 3 data and identify which categories are material (p.204).
The physical-risk work goes further than the company was obliged to go. Having elected the scenario-analysis relief, it still assessed seven hazards (extreme heat, water scarcity, extreme-rainfall flooding, riverine flooding, landslide, cyclone and sea-level rise) for each district with assets, at a baseline and under SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 for 2030 and 2050 (pp.118–119). The results are stated. Almost every district moves to high extreme-heat risk by 2030 under both scenarios, and cyclone risk is high in the Northern, North Central, North-Western and Eastern provinces in every scenario (pp.118–119). The report does not map those results to individual plants, although its wind sites in Mannar and Jaffna lie in the Northern Province (p.88). Nor does it assign a financial value to the hazards, test a transition scenario, or reach a conclusion on the resilience of its strategy; the grid-risk note says fuller analysis is planned (p.116).
No emissions or environmental target is set. The report names FY2025/26 as the base year for emissions, water and waste, and commits to setting “SMART environmental targets for 2030” within one to two years (pp.90, 204). Its SASB index marks the emissions-reduction targets metric as not applicable (p.358).
Other environmental data are measured but narrow in scope. Electricity use was 996,715 kWh, water withdrawal 10,867 m³ (mostly at solar plants, where panel cleaning is the largest use) and waste 17.9 tonnes, about two-thirds of it hazardous e-waste and oils (pp.198–200). All of these cover subsidiaries only: associates are left out of every sustainability metric because WindForce does not control them (p.94). A one-year study of bird-collision risk at the Mannar and Jaffna wind sites, costing about Rs 9 mn, began during the year (pp.88, 201).

Social

WindForce employed 223 people at year-end, up from 206, and 11% were women (p.46). Retention was 91%, with 35 joiners and 20 leavers (p.170). The report records no work-related fatalities (p.168) but gives no recordable-injury rate. Its SASB index points to page 177 for that metric, which describes the safety system without a rate (p.359). Training spending fell to Rs 11 mn from Rs 16 mn (p.46), and 944 hours went to safety training (p.178).
Community investment was Rs 30 mn, reported to have reached more than 72,000 people through itemised projects in Sri Lanka and Uganda (pp.188–190). The supply chain is treated as a risk rather than a measured programme for now. A supplier code of conduct and ESG audits of tier-one suppliers are planned within three years, and the related metrics are deferred (pp.105–106).

Governance

The board has ten directors: three executive, including the managing director and the deputy chairman, and seven non-executive, three of whom are independent (p.208). The chairman is non-executive and not independent (p.58). The two largest shareholders hold 57.00% of the shares between them, and the public holding is 24.57% (pp.346–347).
Climate oversight moved during the year. The former Audit and Risk Committee was split in two, and a separate Risk Committee was constituted on 6 November 2025, with ESG and climate-related responsibilities formally assigned to it (pp.207, 258). It has three non-executive members, two of whom are independent, and met four times during the year (p.258). The SLFRS section sets out its remit in some detail, from approving group ESG policies to reviewing ESG performance reports against KPIs, along with its reporting line from a management risk committee (pp.100–102). The report is direct about one gap: no sustainability KPI is linked to management pay (p.102).
A reader has to work to follow the committee through the report. It is called the Board Risk Committee in the governance and sustainability sections (pp.88, 226), the Integrated Risk Management Committee in the SLFRS section (pp.100–102) and the Risk Committee in its own report (p.258). The structure charts suggest these are one committee (pp.210, 242), but the report never says so.

How We Assess The Disclosure

ESGNexus grades disclosure completeness against a published, equal-weighted, page-referenced checklist of seven criteria drawn from SLFRS S1 and S2 (Disclosure Grading Methodology v1.2). We assess what the report does and does not disclose, not the company’s underlying performance. Each criterion is marked Present, Partial or Absent (or N/A where it genuinely does not apply); the score is elements present divided by applicable elements, mapped to a band. The full checklist below is reproducible: the same report and this rubric should yield the same result.
#CriterionScoreBasis (as disclosed)
1Materiality assessment disclosed, with method shownPresentTwo methods shown: a ten-step GRI impact process with a 15-topic matrix (pp.81–85), and a two-step SLFRS financial-materiality assessment rating likelihood against magnitude, run by management with external advisers (pp.96–99).
2Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions quantified, with methodologyPresentScope 1 247.658 and Scope 2 415.929 tCO₂e, FY2025/26 base year. GHG Protocol, operational control, location-based SLSEA grid factor, IPCC AR6 warming potentials, factor sources tabulated (p.120; also p.200).
3Scope 3 / financed emissions disclosed or explicitly deferredPartialNot quantified. Explicit, dated deferral under the SLFRS S2 transitional relief: Scope 3 “will be reported from the financial period of 2027/2028” (p.95; relief E, p.122). A dated deferral scores 0.5 under v1.2.
4Climate scenario analysis actually performedPartialPhysical-risk scenarios performed: seven hazards assessed by district under SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 for 2030 and 2050, with results stated (pp.118–119). No transition scenario and no assessment of strategic resilience; the scenario-analysis relief is elected (p.122) and fuller analysis is planned (p.116).
5Board-level climate governance described concretelyPresentBoard Risk Committee formally assigned ESG and climate oversight; three non-executives, two independent; met four times (pp.207, 258). Remit, quarterly cycle and reporting line from a management risk committee set out (pp.100–102).
6Quantified targets with baseline year and target dateAbsentNo quantified emissions or environmental target. FY2025/26 named as base year; 2030 targets to be set within one to two years (pp.90, 204). SASB IF-EU-110a.2 (emissions-reduction targets) marked N/A (p.358).
7Integration: mainstream financial report vs. quarantined standalone CSR sectionPresentThe SLFRS S1 and S2 disclosure sits in the Strategic Report of the integrated annual report (pp.91–122), prepared for the same reporting entity and in the same currency as the consolidated financial statements (p.91).
Overall band: SUBSTANTIAL — 5.0 of 7 applicable criteria (0.71), against Methodology v1.2. The gaps are Scope 3 (deferred, dated, to FY2027/28), scenario analysis (physical risk only) and targets (none set). The company states that its disclosures were prepared in accordance with SLFRS S1 and S2 (p.91); a Substantial band measures disclosure completeness against our checklist and is not a compliance verdict.
Alongside the checklist, we characterise the disclosure on four qualitative dimensions (completeness, comparability, credibility and candour), each rated against cited evidence. These carry the nuances the checklist score does not.
DimensionAssessmentBasis (as disclosed)
CompletenessDevelopingE, S and G are all covered with data, but Scope 3 is deferred, no targets are set, and six of the seven identified risks have defined metrics with no values, deferred to next year (pp.104–117). Associates are excluded from all sustainability data (p.94).
ComparabilitySolidRecognised frameworks throughout: SLFRS S1 and S2, GRI “in accordance with” (p.350), the SASB electric utilities index (p.358) and the GHG Protocol with AR6 warming potentials (p.120). No GHG comparative in this base year. The SLFRS table nets avoided emissions into a “Net GHG Emissions” line and labels units MTCO2 (p.120).
CredibilityDevelopingErnst & Young limited assurance covers unspecified “EESG indicators” against GRI criteria; SLFRS S1 and S2 are not named and no indicators are listed (pp.348–349). The risk metrics are stated as not validated by a third party (for example p.117). External advisers supported materiality (pp.5, 96).
CandourSolidLists the SLFRS items it has not disclosed (p.96), dates the Scope 3 deferral (p.95) and states that no sustainability KPI is tied to pay (p.102). Two inconsistencies: p.99 says the climate-only relief was used, Appendix I says it was not (p.121); and the materiality work is described three ways (pp.5, 81, 96).
Source: WindForce PLC, Annual Report 2025/26. Assessment: ESGNexus Disclosure Grading Methodology v1.2.

Where The Disclosure Leads — And Where It Lags

Where it leads. The emissions inventory is fully specified, with boundary, standard, emission factors, warming potentials and data sources on a single page (p.120). The Scope 3 deferral carries a date, which under our method is the difference between half credit and a quarter (p.95). The company ran and published district-level physical scenarios even though it had elected the relief that would have let it leave scenario analysis out (pp.118–119, 122). It also states things a less forthcoming report would leave out: a list of the SLFRS items it has not yet disclosed (p.96) and the absence of any link between pay and sustainability (p.102).
Where it lags. There is no emissions target, and the 2030 targets are a commitment for the next one to two years (p.204). Six of the seven risks arrive with metric definitions and no numbers (pp.104–117), so a reader can see what the company plans to measure but not where it stands today. Assurance is scoped to GRI and does not name the SLFRS disclosures (pp.348–349). The “Net GHG Emissions” line brings an estimate of avoided emissions into the inventory table (p.120). The contradictions on the climate-only relief (pp.99, 121) and on the scope of the materiality work (pp.5, 81, 96) are small one by one, but in a first-year filing they make a reader’s job harder than it needs to be. And because associates sit outside every sustainability metric, the figures cover the subsidiaries WindForce controls, not its six associates (pp.94, 210).

What This Means For Investors And Lenders

The fair reading is that WindForce has built the measurement base this year and deferred most of the outputs to the next two. That makes the FY2026/27 report the one to watch, and three questions sit on it. Will the 2030 targets cover absolute Scope 1 and 2 emissions, and will Scope 3 arrive in FY2027/28 as the company has dated it (p.95)? Will the hazard results be tied to specific plants, the Northern Province wind sites in particular, and given a financial value? And will the assurance engagement name the SLFRS disclosures as subject matter? The first two would each move a criterion on this checklist; the third would change how far a reader can rely on everything else.

Sources And Further Reading

WindForce PLC, Annual Report 2025/26 “Beyond Megawatts”, year ended 31 March 2026, filed with the Colombo Stock Exchange, August 2026 — cdn.cse.lk
ESGNexus, Disclosure Grading Methodology v1.2 — esgnexus.lk/how-we-grade
CSE Utilities sector market capitalisation, cross-checked against Simply Wall St market data, accessed 15 November 2026 — simplywall.st
ESGNexus, “Sri Lanka Approved Sixteen Battery Sites. Thirteen Are Being Built, And Nobody Reported The Thirteenth”, 13 October 2026 — esgnexus.lk
About ESGNexus
ESGNexus is Sri Lanka’s independent platform for ESG, CSR, and sustainability intelligence. We track company-level ESG performance, regulatory developments, and sustainability data across Sri Lanka’s listed companies, large unlisted corporates, and state-owned enterprises. All editorial content is independently produced. Sponsored content is clearly labelled.
Data disclaimer: This profile is compiled from WindForce PLC’s publicly available reports and other public sources, for general information only. It is not investment advice and not a comprehensive audit of the company’s sustainability performance. ESGNexus does not independently verify company disclosures; figures are as reported by the company. Assessments reflect the quality of disclosure, not a certification of underlying performance. ESGNexus corrects errors promptly; to flag one, contact the editorial team. Errors and omissions excepted.
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